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For many organizations it is an agonizing dilemma to decide whether to charge 
departments for the considerable costs of providing MIS services and, if so, which of 
these services should be assessed. Interestingly, the same rationale that supports 
chargebacks would also seem to indicate that a firm allow its departments to seek 
computer services externally, but this raises additional and even graver problems of 
control and security, which are beyond the intended scope of this paper. In any event, a 
negative answer to the subsidiary question of whether to allow use of external MIS 
resources does not per se impact the chargeback decision.  
This paper provides a conceptual structure for decision making about instituting MIS 
chargebacks, and applies economic models (one for production, the other for trade-offs 
between inputs) to justify the use of chargebacks. These standard economic models help 
demonstrate (1) that goods priced artificially low will invariably be overused and even 
disguise a decline in productivity of the department's efforts for the firm, and (2) that 
charging departments for MIS services, is always advised except in the case where 
management desires to encourage projects with unproven output. The contribution of this 
paper lies in providing a general affirmative answer to the question of whether to 
introduce chargebacks unless, of course, the cost of a chargeback system exceeds the 
benefit to be realized--but this is highly unlikely.  
The economic model of production specifies certain conditions in which a company must 
operate if it is to exist in a competitive environment. Chargebacks clarify these conditions 
for the departments of a company by forcing all users to be more accountable for, 
reflective upon, and less likely to overuse MIS services.  
A firm considers a non-manufacturing department as a cost center if it incurs expenses 
but does not directly (as perceived by the firm) generate or enhance revenues. Whenever 
the MIS department is so regarded, its prestige and potential for strategic advantage 
invariably decline, a result that in many cases leads to lost opportunities for the firm as 
well as unwarranted MIS downsizing.  
On the other hand, if MIS is permitted to be a profit center and is required to account for 
its financial actions in terms of demanded services (as it would under a chargeback 
regimen), it will perform more efficiently and better meet the needs of the other 
departments--perhaps even reducing any applications backlog. The exertions of MIS to 
realize profits through chargebacks and the resultant scrutiny by the other departments of 
their billed services causes not only a disciplined use of MIS services but also a greater 
consciousness of the benefits of these services.  
It would not be sufficient to have user departments justify their computer needs in the 
course of general budgeting, because in the absence of financial amercement they could 
simply overstate their requirements as a precaution against unforeseen events or in an 
effort to circumvent anticipated reductions mandated by management. Chargebacks 
reduce the incentive for any such tactical moves.  
A negative view of chargebacks often stems from a feeling that the chargeback system 
itself generates unnecessary costs to the firm and interferes with other processes and 
computer runs. There are even those who claim that without chargebacks, management 
can more easily determine and pinpoint actual computer costs by examining only one 
department, namely, MIS. Still, the task of gathering the MIS cost figures is trivial 
compared to the efficiencies to be realized from a chargeback system.  
An important consideration raised by Markus is that judgments based on "value 
economics" where users decide to substitute one service for another play a role in the 
success or counterproductivity of a chargeback system, particularly in regard to email, 
phone and fax systems. She also raises the issue of whether the purpose of chargebacks is 
to recover costs or to control usage. The answer proposed in our article is that 
chargebacks are designed to enhance both the financial and strategic performance of the 
company with regard to its use of MIS. This is accomplished by presenting two economic 
models that contrast the effects of utilizing chargebacks with those of not charging for 
MIS services.  
Let us characterize (1) an economic good, in such a way as to include any computer 
service or output, that is, as something wanted or desired and commands a price, and (2) 
a department as an organizational unit that generates one or more economic goods, which 
we will designate departmental output, or DO. Typically, the value of this output is 
measured by either its transfer price or its cost of production, figures normally available 
from a firm's internal financial statements.  
Thus it is appropriate to apply the general economic model of production, shown in 
Figure 1, which consists of three stages. The horizontal axis represents technical 
efficiency, while the vertical axis represents departmental output. With the inputs as 
shown, a business unit will profit by increasing production during Stage I, because its 
marginal output is positive, and its marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost. The 
line separating Stage I and Stage II is where marginal production intersects average 
production from above. Marginal productivity remains positive during Stage II, making it 
beneficial to continue the expansion of production. However, in Stage III, marginal 
productivity becomes negative and total production is deteriorating. No firm can continue 
its expansion in Stage III and pull through if its competitors are operating in Stage II--on 
account of their lower costs. A reliable chargeback system enables all of the firm's 
departments to determine the point at which they would enter the danger zone of Stage 
III. Now, marginal profit can be defined as marginal revenue less marginal cost. It is 
beneficial to increase production up to the boundary between Stages II and III because a 
marginal profit of zero (where marginal cost equals marginal revenue) allows the greatest 
profits.  
Whereas the model in Figure 1 assumes the firm is using its optimal mix of inputs, in 
Figure 2 we have a two-good model that illustrates the time-honored economic exchange 
of inputs K and L (capital and labor). Naturally, this model can be adjusted to represent 
two other inputs: MIS services and All-Other-Inputs (hereafter, AOI). The depicted curve 
is known as a technical efficiency frontier containing all points (without considering 
costs) where as few inputs as possible serve to generate the same, given output. At Point 
B, for instance, we have the greatest use of MIS services consistent with the least use of 
all other inputs (AOI) that can produce the given output.  
On the basis of the relative productivity of MIS and AOI compared to their factor prices, 
there exists an optimal mix of these goods. Thus, an additional expenditure for MIS 
services that would produce a certain output value would be wiser than spending the 
same amount on AOI, if less output value is expected. Should the relative factor prices be 
changed, rational managers adjust their expenditures accordingly.  
An interesting case arises if the cost of MIS services approaches zero; managers would 
consume whatever MIS services they could, while striving to remain at or under Point B. 
A point on the curve above Point B, like D1, would involve greater use of MIS and the 
same amount of AOI as another point on the curve, namely D2, which is directly below 
Point D1. It would be extravagant to operate at Point D1 when the same output could be 
achieved by operating at Point D2. Mutatis mutandis, if the cost of producing DO by 
using non-MIS services approached zero, it would be rational to exploit AOI and neglect 
the availability of MIS services, up to Point C. Point C represents the case where 
whatever can be done by AOI (e.g., manual processes) is at a maximal level. On account 
of the curve bending backwards at both ends, a department must try to remain on the 
curve between Points B and C.  
Suppose there were some point, A, that marks a cost-minimization point for the firm, but 
perhaps not for the department. This point, A, must then represent either a case of least 
total cost for a given quantity of output or a case of greatest output for a given total cost 
of input. Point A must lie on the boundary point between Stages II and III of Figure 1; all 
other points on the curve in Figure 2 involve lower total output for a given input cost. 
Hence, whenever a departmental manager is charged an artificially low amount for one 
input, namely, MIS services, then the manager adjusts the mix of inputs to arrive at Point 
B, which, of course, is more costly to the firm than is Point A. Since the manager views 
Point B as a lower cost to the department than Point A, and it produces the same DO, it is 
to be expected that he or she views the marginal productivity of as Point B being higher 
as well  
Therefore, whenever a manager is not realistically charged for use of an input, not only 
will he or she overuse that input, but might also have a mistakenly high impression of 
departmental marginal productivity and expect to be rewarded based on this impression. 
However, as shown in Figure 3, the manager would unfortunately be operating in the 
danger zone of Stage III rather than in Stage II.  
The economic models presented here have enabled us to see that (1) there is some 
optimal combination of MIS services and all other inputs used to produce a department's 
goods, and (2) a chargeback system has value in assisting departmental managers to 
ascertain a technically and economically efficient use of available MIS resources. Note: 
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